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I. INTRODUCTION
The workload of appellate courts has grown dramatically in re-
cent years. Filings in the federal courts of appeals increased nearly
300% from 1961 to 1974.' State supreme courts have also begun to
feel the burden of a substantial increase in their caseloads.2 Filings
in the Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, rose from a total of
584 in 1971 to 921 in 1975,1 an increase of 58% in only four years.
This trend has resulted in long delays before appeals can be
heard and finally decided. Minnesota, one of the few states with a
population over two million having only one appellate court, has
experienced considerable delay problems.' In 1976, the average case
processing time for opinions issued by the Minnesota Supreme Court
was 14.25 months. By comparison, the American Bar Association
standard for timely disposition of complex appellate cases is approxi-
mately seven months.'
1. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBURG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 4 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL].
2. In Virginia and Nebraska, for example, supreme court filings have increased
more than 200% between 1962 and 1971. D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND
PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VoLUME, at 8 (1974).
3. L. JENSEN & J. REHAK, MINNESOTA SUPEME COURT AuTOMATED CASEFLOW,
MANAGEMEN AND DocmKING FEAsIBmTY REPORT 95 (excerpt on file at the Minnesota
Law Review).
4. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121, 131 (1977).
5. L. JENSEN & J. REHAK, supra note 3, at 20.
6. The ABA standards for appellate decisionmaking are as follows:
(1) Record. The record should be completed within 30 days after it is ordered.
A shorter time should be provided in appeals that normally do not require
transcripts, for example appeals from interlocutory orders.
(2) Briefs. Appellant's brief should be filed within 30 days after the record
is filed in civil cases and 20 days in criminal cases. The briefs of appellee or
respondent and other parties should be filed within 30 days after appellant's
brief is filed in civil cases and 20 days in criminal cases. Reply briefs should
be optional and required to be filed within 10 days after respondent's brief
has been filed.
(3) Argument and Submission. Oral argument, or the decision conference in
cases not orally argued, should be held promptly after the briefs are closed.
Responsibility for the court's opinion or memorandum should be assigned at
the decision conference and preparation of the opinion or memorandum
commenced as soon as possible.
(4) Decision. For a court sitting in panels of three judges, the average time
for rendering decision should not exceed 30 days; the maximum time for any
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A less apparent but more serious result of appellate overcrowding
is the adverse effect it has on the judicial decisionmaking process and
the quality of appellate decisions themselves. The traditional appel-
late decisionmaking process consisted of an initial evaluation of a
case by an individual judge followed by a final decision reached
through collaborative efforts of the full court.7 With the volume of
cases increasing, however, judges often do not have the time to study
fully all the briefs and records,8 nor have they sufficient opportunity
to express their own views, or reflect on those of their colleagues, in
opinion conferences and dissenting opinions.9 These time constraints,
of course, may affect the outcome of cases. For example, a recent
study indicated that appellate courts processing fewer cases are more
likely to reverse than are more crowded courts."
Courts and legislatures have made various attempts to cope with
the rising tide of appellate litigation. Some jurisdictions have re-
sponded by adding new judges11 or increasing the number of law
clerks and other support personnel.1 2 Another approach taken by sev-
case, except for one of extraordinary complexity, should not exceed 60 days.
For a court sitting in larger panels, the average time should not exceed 60
days; the maximum time, except in cases of extraordinary complexity,
should not exceed 90 days.
AmE~mcA BAR AssociAToN, STANDARDS RELATING To APLTE COURTS § 3.52 (1977).
Thus, assuming arguendo that all appellate cases warrant maximum consideration
time, have reply briefs filed, are heard before a full panel of judges, and are granted a
30 day hearing delay, the average total processing time would be 220 days, or approxi-
mately 7.3 months.
7. See JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 9. This traditional process is some-
times said to embody the twin imperatives of "judicial individuality" and "judicial
collegiality." See id. See generally K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMmoN LAw TRADi-
TIoN-DEciniO APPEALS (1960); R. POUND, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION
WrrH THE ADMINwSTRATiON OF JusTicE (1906).
8. See Address by Justice James Otis of the Minnesota Supreme Court to the
Appellate Practice Institute, Minneapolis, Minnesota, at 2 (Nov. 4, 1977) (transcript
on file at the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Otis Address].
9. Id.
10. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, supra note 4, at 131. These
authors found that reversals increased in the North Carolina Supreme Court after the
creation of an intermediate appellate court that allowed the supreme court greater
discretion in selecting cases. But see Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role
of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 1203 (1978) (reporting empirical findings
that do not support the hypothesis that more crowded courts have lower reversal rates).
11. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, added two more justices to the
existing seven-member panel in 1973. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 726, § 1, 1973 Minn.
Laws 2134 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 480.01 (1978)). The response of adding new
justices has obvious limitations. Beyond a certain number, the law of diminishing
returns may begin to operate. See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48,
54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1506, 82d Cong., 2d Sesas.
(1952)).
12. Law clerks typically assist an individual judge with his research and other
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eral states that previously had two-tiered court systems, has been to
create an intermediate appellate court, allowing the highest state
court to hear cases only upon grant of certiorari. 3 Attempts have also
been made to abbreviate decisionmaking procedures in certain cases.
Some courts use a screening process to segregate cases for different
procedural treatment according to their importance and complex-
ity." The increased use of summary and per curiam opinions is an-
other means by which appellate decisionmaking time has been re-
duced. 5
In 1976, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a different ap-
proach to the problem of appellate overcrowding. Instead of increas-
ing its number of decisionmakers, or further abbreviating its appel-
late procedure, the court introduced mandatory prehearing confer-
routine tasks. See Ragatz & Shea, Supreme Court Law Clerks, 35 Wis. B. BULL. 33
(1962). A recent variation on the individual clerk practice has been the utilization of
central staffs. Under this method of organization, the staff performs the traditional
functions as well as other tasks such as screening cases for different procedural treat-
ment, monitoring the processing of appeals, and placing cases on calendars for argu-
ment. The central staff clerks are not assigned to individual judges, but rather work
as a team under the direction of a central staff director. See generally D. MEADOR,
supra note 2, at 231-39. For examples of the makeup and function of central staffs in
the Michigan Courts of Appeals, the California Court of Appeals for the First Appellate
District, and the United States Courts of Appeal, see id. at 198-216, 231-39.
13. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 4; Omo CONST. art. IV, § 6; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 37, § 25 (Smith-Hurd 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 111 (Purdon 1962). Some
states provide for direct appeal to the highest appellate court only in certain specified
cases and allow other appeals to be heard only upon grant of certiorari, writ of error,
or some similar jurisdictional grant. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 32.2 (Smith-
Hurd 1979) (appeal by right to highest appellate court for questions raised under the
United States or state constitution for the first time as a result of appellate court
action, or certification by a panel of the appellate court for decision by the supreme
court or leave of the supreme court); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 181 (Purdon 1962)
(superior court jurisdiction by writ of certiorari or error; original jurisdiction in su-
preme court by writ of mandamus or prohibition).
14. In Minnesota, for example, a commissioner appointed by the supreme court
reviews the records and briefs for each appeal, except for special matters. L. JENSEN &
J. REHAcK, supra note 3, at 9. Based on his review, the commissioner determines
whether a case should be briefed and argued orally, or whether it should be decided
solely on the basis of submitted briefs. See MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 134.07(2). If a case
is assigned for oral argument, the commissioner, based upon the "legal and judicial
significance of the issues raised," advises whether it should be argued before the court
en banc or before a three-judge panel. MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 135(2). If a case is
scheduled for decision without oral argument, the commissioner prepares a memoran-
dum to aid the court in its decision. D. MEADOR, supra note 2, at 227. For a descrip-
tion of this process in the Michigan Court of Appeals, see id. at 201.
15. Summary opinions state the disposition of a matter without further explana-
tion. See, e.g., MINN. R. Cirv. APP. P. 136.01. A per curiam or memorandum opinion
provides explanation of the reason for a decision, but usually not the court's entire
reasoning process. See generally JUsTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 1, at 33-41.
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ences in order to decrease the number of cases that reached the
appellate level for decision. The prehearing conference is not a novel
idea. Since 1938 federal trial courts have employed pretrial confer-
ences under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The use
of this type of conference dates back even further in state trial
courts.'" Appellate courts, however, have not adopted such confer-
ences until quite recently. In 1974, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals became the first federal appellate court to experiment with
prehearing conferences."
The overriding purpose of the prehearing conferences is to reduce
litigation by encouraging parties to settle their disputes prior to an
appellate hearing. This Note examines how well the prehearing con-
ference has served that purpose in its first year of use in Minnesota.
The Note first describes the conference procedures and discusses the
controversy that has surrounded the use of prehearing conferences at
the appellate level. Next, it describes the empirical tools used by the
authors to study the impact of these conferences on the 1976-1977
Minnesota Supreme Court. Finally, this Note analyzes the results of
that empirical study and makes several suggestions for the future use
of prehearing conferences in Minnesota.
11. THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE IN MINNESOTA,
1976-1977
A. THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE PROCEDURE
The Minnesota Supreme Court began using prehearing confer-
ences on September 20, 1976.11 Appellants were required, when serv-
16. See Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451, 453 (1970).
17. See Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural
Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1094, 1094 (1974). See also Goldman, The Appellate
Settlement Conference: An Effective Procedural Reform, STATE COURT J. (Winter
1978) (study concluding that the preargument conference has not reduced the Second
Circuit's workload).
18. Original authority for the procedure was provided by the rules of civil appel-
late procedure as follows:
The Supreme Court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before the Supreme Court or a judge or a designated officer thereof for a
prehearing conference to consider settlement, simplification of the issues,
and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceedings by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court or judge thereof shall make an order
which recites the action taken at the conference and the agreements made
by the parties as to any of the matters considered and which limits the issues
to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel. Such order
when entered controls the subsequent course of the proceeding, unless modi-
fied to prevent manifest injustice.




A. Prehearing Conference Statement. With the service of the notice of ap-
peal pursuant to Appellate Rule 103.01(1), or the filing of the writ pursuant
to Appellate Rule 115.03(3), the appellant or relator shall serve on all other
parties separately represented and transmit (with proof of service) to the
prehearing judge a completed prehearing conference statement in the form
attached hereto.
Within ten days after service of appellant's statement, the respondent
shall serve on all other parties separately represented, and bring (with proof
of service) to the Prehearing Conference, a Prehearing Conference Statement
supplementing that of appellant in the particulars respondent deems to be
of assistance to the Court.
B. Notice of Prehearing Conference-Duties of Parties. Following receipt
of appellant's statement, the court shall schedule a Prehearing Conference
pursuant to Appellate Rule 133.02 unless it notifies the parties to the con-
trary. The attorneys for the parties shall be notified of the time and place of
the conference, which will be held promptly, before the record is transcribed
and briefs prepared. Attendance at the conference by the attorneys shall be
obligatory. They shall have full authority to reach settlements, limit issues
and deal with such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the appeal.
Upon receipt of the notice of Prehearing Conference, the attorneys shall
make arrangements for their clients or their clients' insurers or indemnitors
to be available at the time of the conference by telephone communication
to approve matters requiring client approval. In divorce custody, alimony,
and support cases, the clients may in some instances be required to accom-
pany their attorneys to the hearing.
C. Transcript. In all cases subject to Rule 133.02, the 60-day period permit-
ted the reporter for furnishing a transcript pursuant to Rule 110.02(2) shall
not commence to run until entry of the Prehearing Conference Order or
receipt of notice from the Court that a conference will not be held. The
appellant shall notify the reporter of such order or notice.
D. Prehearing Conference. The Prehearing Conference shall be conducted
by a justice of the Court or a hearing officer designated by the Court. The
justice who conducts the conference shall not participate in any subsequent
decisional process. No court personnel, attorney, party or any other person
taking part in the conference shall make public or communicate to, or dis-
cuss with, anyone engaged in the decisional process any matters considered
or divulged at the conference which do not subsequently appear in the Pre-
hearing Conference Order.
E. Prehearing Conference Order. An order shall be entered following the
conference and shall reflect only the procedures or disposition to which the
parties have agreed as follows:
(1) Dismissal of the appeal
(2) Limitation of the issues
(3) Continuation of the appeal unaffected by Rule 133.02
(4) Adoption of any procedures appropriate to the purpose of Rule
133.02.
F. Sanctions. Failure of a party or his attorney to obey the foregoing provi-
sions of this Order shall result in such sanctions as the Court may deem
appropriate.
G. Exceptions. The provisions of this Order are not applicable to extraordi-
nary writ proceedings pursuant to Appellate Rule 120.




The rule and order have been recently revised. The rule now reads:
The Supreme Court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear
before a justice thereof for a Prehearing Conference to consider the applica-
tion or nonapplication of Rule 133.01 settlement, simplification of the issues,
and such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceedings by
the Supreme Court. The justice shall ascertain whether or not the appeal
should be decided, remanded, or dismissed pursuant to Rule 133.01, shall so
recommend to the Supreme Court, and may participate in the decisional
process of the Court with respect thereto. The justice shall make an order
which recites the recommendations made pursuant to Rule 133.01 and the
agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters considered and
which limits the issues to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel.
MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 133.02. The amended order reads:
A. Prehearing Conference Statement. Simultaneously with the service of
the notice of appeal pursuant to Appellate Rule 103.01(1), or with the filing
of the writ pursuant to Appellate Rule 115.03(3), the appellant or relator
shall serve on all other parties separately represented, and transmit (with
proof of service) to the clerk of Supreme Court a completed Prehearing
Conference Statement in the form prescribed by the Court. The statement
will not be treated as confidential.
Within ten days after service of appellant's statement, the respondent
shall serve on all other parties separately represented and within three days
thereafter file with the clerk of supreme court (with proof of service) a Pre-
hearing Conference Statement supplementing that of appellant in the par-
ticulars respondent deems to be of assistance to the Court.
B. Notice of Prehearing Conference-Duties of Parties. Following receipt
of appellant's statement, the Court shall schedule a Prehearing Conference
pursuant to Appellate Rule 133.02 unless it notifies the parties to the con-
trary. The attorneys for the parties shall be notified of the time and place of
the conference, which will be held promptly, before the record is transcribed
and briefs prepared. Attendance at the conference by the attorneys shall be
obligatory. They shall have full authority to reach settlements, limit issues,
and deal with such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the appeal.
Upon receipt of the notice of Prehearing Conference, the attorneys shall
make arrangements for their clients or their clients' insurers or indemnitors
to be available at the time of the conference by telephone communication
to approve matters requiring client approval. The clients may in some in-
stances be required to accompany their attorneys to the hearing.
C. Transcript. The appellant will not order a transcript until authorized by
the Court to do so. Upon receipt of such authorization, the appellant shall,
pursuant to Rule 110.02, notify the court reporter.
D. Prehearing Conference. The Prehearing Conference shall be conducted
by a justice of the Court. Settlement discussions, if any, shall be confiden-
tial, otherwise the documents presented and discussions conducted will not
be treated as confidential.
E. Prehearing Conference Order. The Prehearing Conference justice shall
issue an order reciting the action taken at the Prehearing Conference and his
recommendation, if any, pursuant to Rule 133. The justice may also recom-
mend any other procedures appropriate to Rule 133.02 and the assignment
of the appeal to En Banc, division, or non-oral consideration.
G. Exceptions. The provisions of this Order are not applicable to extraordi-
nary writs pursuant to Appellate Rule 120.
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ing notice of appeal or filing a writ in a civil matter (extraordinary
writs excluded)," to also serve a prehearing statement on all other
parties and to transmit a copy of the statement to the prehearing
official."0 The respondent and all other parties were then required to
file a return statement.2 The prehearing statement consisted of a
form on which counsel supplied information identifying the case, the
areas of law involved, the issues and outcome below and the issues
presented for appeal, and any other additional information that
might assist the parties in reaching a voluntary settlement." In addi-
Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court, January 10, 1979. [hereinafter cited as
Order of 1979].
Since this Note analyzes the prehearing conference only in its first year of opera-
tion, its discussion is based on the procedure under the 1976 rule and order.
19. Order of 1976, supra note 18, A.
20. Id. For an explanation of the "prehearing official" and his role, see notes 28-
30 infra and accompanying text. Under the new order, the statement is to be transmit-
ted to the clerk of court. Order of 1979, supra note 18.
21. Order of 1976, supra note 18, A.
22. The form used under the order of 1976 was as follows:
STATE OF
MINNESOTA IN Please complete and
S. Ct. File No. SUPREME COURT Return to "Prehearing
CIVIL APPEAL Judge," 230 Capitol
PREHEARING St. Paul, 55155
CONFERENCE no later than
1. Title of Case:
2. Names and Addresses and Telephone of Attorneys:
For Appellant or Relator:
For Respondent:
For Other Parties:
3. Court or Agency as to which Review is sought:
Name of Judge or Hearing Officer:
4. Type of Litigation (e.g., automobile negligence, products liability, mal-
practice, real estate, zoning, taxation. UCC, domestic matters, insurance,
etc.):
5. Brief description of claims, defenses, issues litigated, and result below
(do not detail evidence):
6. Nature of judgment or order as to which review is sought (appellant:
attach copy of judgment or order as well as a copy of any memorandum,
finding of facts, or conclusions of law of the court or agency below.) Order of
1976, supra note 18.
7. Issues proposed to be raised on appeal (attach any trial briefs which are
relevant to these issues and which were submitted to the court or agency
below. DO NOT PREPARE OR SUBMIT AN APPELLATE BRIEF OR
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT FOR THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE):
8. This prehearing conference is designed to encourage the parties to reach
a voluntary settlement before incurring the expense of securing a transcript
and preparing and printing briefs, or if that is not possible, to limit the
1979] 1227
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tion, counsel were required to attach any trial briefs or other docu-
ments relevant to the issues raised on appeal."
Prehearing conferences were held in all civil cases except those
that the court had decided were not amenable to conference proce-
dures because of their great social impact or other extraordinary cir-
cumstances.24 Attendance at the conference was mandatory; 2 attor-
neys for the parties were required to come with full authority to settle,
and were to make arrangements for their clients to be available by
telephone for matters requiring client approval. 6 In some instances,
the prehearing official directed that clients themselves attend the
conference.Y
The conferences were conducted by either a justice or an officer
appointed by the court.2 In order to ensure free discussion, the mat-
ters discussed in the conference were kept strictly confidential29 and,
if a justice conducted the conference, he was excluded from the
court's later consideration of the case.
The primary focus of the conference was to reach a voluntary
settlement.3' Nonetheless, other matters, including limitation and
clarification of issues, were considered. 2 Some cases were remanded
back to the lower court for fuller determination of facts.3 All agree-
ments were to be made by stipulation of the parties.34 And, with the
issues. Please set forth succinctly any additional information which will
assist the court and the parties in reaching an agreement to accomplish these
ends. Information concerning settlement negotiations will be kept strictly
confidential.
Signed Date
TO BE EXECUTED BY THE ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT OR
RESPONDENT WHO IS HANDLING THE APPEAL.
23. Order of 1976, supra note 18.
24. See Otis Address, supra note 8, at 6-7.
25. Order of 1976, supra note 18, B.
26. Id. In actual practice, counsel seldom came to the conference authorized to
settle. The sanction generally applied when this situation occurred was to order that
counsel appear at a second conference with their clients. Otis Address, supra note 8,
at 14.
27. Order of 1976, supra note 18, B.
28. MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.02 (1976) (repealed 1979). The new rule provides
that only justices may conduct conferences. MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 133.02.
29. Order of 1976, supra note 18, D. Under the new order only settlement dis-
cussions are confidential. Order of 1979, supra note 18, D.
30. Order of 1976, supra note 18, D. The new order, on the other hand, permits
a justice to participate in the final disposition of cases for which he has conducted the
prehearing conference. MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.02.
31. Otis Address, supra note 8, at 14.
32. See MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.02 (1976) (repealed 1979).
33. Otis Address, supra note 8, at 17.
34. Otis, Prehearing Conferences-A Help or a Hinderance to Appellate
Litigation, HENNPN CouNTY LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18, 20.
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possible exception of narrowing issues, the conference official had no
authority to render decisions that would affect the outcome of the
case. 5
To prepare for the conference, the presiding official reviewed the
prehearing statements, trial briefs, and memoranda prepared by his
clerk analyzing the questions of fact and law. The review was made
without appellate briefs or transcripts, since neither were prepared
before the conference." During the course of the conference the pre-
siding official typically invited the appellant and the respondent to
give their versions of the issues; then he summarized what he believed
would be the court's attitude toward the case.17 The official usually
provided an "educated estimate of the likelihood of reversal." At
some point, he "stressed the fact that 80% of [Minnesota Supreme
Court] appeals are affirmed." 3 In a case he believed to be plainly
without merit, the conference official could go even further and rec-
ommend that the respondent move for summary affirmance10 Fol-
lowing the conference, an order was issued reflecting the matters
upon which the parties had agreed.41 If no settlement was reached,
the appeal proceeded in the regular manner.
B. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST PREHEARING CONFERENCES
Advocates of the prehearing conference claim that it offers sev-
eral benefits to the appellate court system, the most important of
which is an increase in voluntary settlements. In theory, a greater
number of settlements should reduce the court's caseload and permit
35. Id. at 18.
36. Otis Address, iupra note 8, at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. This method of discouraging appeals has been vigorously criticized as an
example of the "gambler's fallacy" which confuses case probability with class proba-
bility. See William H. Adams Ell, Some Observations on the Minnesota Prehearing
Conference, at 7 (May 4, 1977) (unpublished report) (on file at the Minnesota Law
Review).
40. Otis, supra note 34, at 18. In certain cases the conference official's attempts
to induce settlements may become quite extreme. Justice Otis stated that "on occasion
we . . . use some pretty unsubtle language to describe the merits of the case such as
'if you insist on pursuing this appeal, counsel, I hope at the same time you keep up
the payments on your malpractice policy.'" Id. at 20.
41. Order of 1976, supra note 18, E. The actual practice in the first year of
conference operation was to issue an order only for remands or other action requiring
formal disposition. In other instances, the conference officer simply sent a letter to the
parties, summarizing the agreements reached or the decisions made at a conference.
Otis Address, supra note 8, at 5.
The new conference procedures explicitly permit the presiding justice to recom-
mend summary action. See MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.01, .02.
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it to spend more time deciding each case."2 The conference is said to
encourage settlements in a number of ways. First, by requiring that
the parties come together in a neutral atmosphere to discuss settle-
ment, the conference removes the problem of the party who is predis-
posed toward settlement but fears that any unilateral suggestion on
his part would be seen by his opponent as an admission of weakness. 3
Second, the conference makes it simpler for the lawyer who believes
his client's case is weak to advise settlement, because a neutral and
authoritative figure like the conference official will have given that
same advice." Third, a recalcitrant party may become more amena-
ble to settlement following a frank discussion by the conferees which
alerts him to the weakness or futility of his case on appeal.45 Fourth,
settlement prospects are enhanced among parties who perceive the
prehearing conference as their "day in court."" Finally, even the
most litigious appellants are more likely to settle after not only their
lawyers but supreme court justices advise them to do so. 7
Proponents of the conference maintain that it offers other bene-
fits to the parties as well. The fact that briefs and transcripts need
not be prepared before the conference may save the litigants substan-
tial amounts of time and money." And even in those cases that do
not settle at conference, the presiding official can focus counsels'
attention on issues that the court will likely find dispositive. As a
42. See generally Otis, supra note 34, at 3; Kaufman, supra note 17, at 1102-03.
43. Mack, Settlement Procedures in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Proposal, 1
JusT. Sys. J. 17, 26 (1975). Cf. Kaufman, supra note 17, at 1095 (Pretrial conferences
encourage parties to discuss settlement without fear of revealing weakness.).
44. See text accompanying notes 61-63, 77-83 infra. This possibility has been
recognized in the federal pretrial conference setting. One federal district court judge
has remarked:
I tell them, "this case is worth $20,000 for the settlement," . and I tell
them further to go tell their client that I said so. . . [a]nd the funny thing
is the lawyers in our district want. . . to be able to go back to their clients
and have some of the load taken off their shoulders. They say, "this is what
I think but the judge says this."
Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, 145 (1961).
45. Otis. supra note 34. at 20
46. Mack, supra note 43, at 26-27.
47. See Otis Address, supra note 8, at 14.
48. See Order of 1976, supra note 18, 1 B. Chief Justice Sheran has stated that
[g]iven the 80-percent rate of affirmance in civil appeals, it is obvious that
the time and money of most appellate litigants are being wasted, and their
expectations frustrated. The civil appeal prehearing conferences are de-
signed to, in the aggregate, reduce the waste of time, the waste of money,
and the frustration and uncertainty of delay that inevitably accompany civil
appeal.




result, counsel may concentrate their efforts on those issues, produc-
ing higher quality briefs and more incisive oral arguments."
There is, however, a disagreement among conference supporters
over the important question of who should preside at the prehearing
conference. Some favor a system that allows only justices to preside,
while others feel that a system employing non-judicial officers of the
court would be superior . 5 The former consider the prestige and expe-
rience of a supreme court justice essential to a successful conference.
In their opinion, only the justices are familiar enough with the juris-
prudence of the court and the dispositions of its members to accur-
ately predict the outcome of cases.' Also, they believe that only
justices command the respect necessary to persuade experienced
members of the bar to settle cases they would ordinarily litigate, or
to exclude issues they would normally argue.52 Finally, they contend
that the presence of a justice is vital to the substitute "day in court"
effect that the conference offers.0
There are also several sound reasons that may be advanced for
the use of non-judicial officers. Because such a system would not
remove a justice from court to hear conferences, it assures a net
saving of the court's time if settlements increase." In addition, the
danger of litigants being coerced into settlement may be less if an
officer presides; attorneys who may unwillingly agree to settlement
out of fear of offending a Supreme Court justice before whom they
are likely to appear in the future" will not be burdened by such fears
when a non-judicial officer presides. Finally, the use of non-judicial
personnel eliminates the special problems that may occur when the
prehearing conference procedures allow a justice to participate in the
final decision of the same case for which he has conducted a confer-
ence." In such a situation a justice may wish to preserve his image
49. See Otis Address, supra note 8, at 3-4.
50. In Minnesota, under the old conference rules, see note 18, both justices and
non-judicial officers were allowed to preside. Under the amended rules, only justices
may preside. See id.
51. See Otis, supra note 34, at 19 (few cases are so complex that a Supreme Court
Justice can not grasp issues and predict outcomes).
52. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra.
53. See generally note 46 supra and accompanying text. But see Mack, supra
note 43, at 29 (non-judicial personnel may be able to create the "day-in court effect"
to some extent).
54. If a justice presides for a number of conferences, it is possible that the
amount of time that the court saves by virtue of the increased settlement rate could
be outweighed by the amount of additional time spent preparing for and holding
conferences; the result would be a net loss in judicial efficiency. This effect would be
particularly burdensome if the settlement rate did not increase substantially.
55. See Adams, supra note 39, at 13.
56. While the original preconference procedure in Minnesota did not allow a
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of neutrality and, therefore, refrain from taking an active role in
settlement discussions" at the conference because of the possibility
of an upcoming hearing. Counsel also may be hesitant to discuss the
case candidly for fear that their remarks at the conference will ad-
versely affect the justice's perception of the issues if the case goes to
hearing."
Critics of the prehearing conference are skeptical about the bene-
fits claimed by its proponents. They maintain that the conference
does not decrease, and may even increase, the strain on the appellate
courts. One critic has suggested that prehearing conferences discour-
age settlement because their participants disregard the conference
officials' advice, perceiving it to be motivated more by a desire to
reduce the court's workload than to reach a fair result. 9
Even if the conference does increase the rate of settlement it may
not reduce the court's workload or speed the processing of cases. The
prehearing conference adds another procedural step to the appellate
process. Scheduling, preparing for, and holding pretrial conferences
consume significant amounts of time. Also, at least in Minnesota, the
conference effectively removes one justice from the court. Thus, both
total case processing time and the number of cases that each justice
must decide may actually increase as a result of the conference."
It has been suggested that the cases most likely to settle at the
conference are those having little merit, often involving non-
appealable orders and issues of fact. Since they are the sort of cases
that the court can quickly dispose of by summary action," opponents
of the conference argue that an increase in settlements gained only
by the time-consuming process of holding a conference for each civil
appeal, represents no real reduction in the court's workload, but
rather a good deal of wasted effort. 2 Moreover, the conference may
actually encourage the filing of meritless appeals; since briefs and
transcripts need not be prepared beforehand, it provides a relatively
inexpensive forum for attacking adverse lower court judgments."3
justice to take part in deciding a case for which he has conducted a prehearing confer-
ence, see Order of 1976, supra note 18, D, the new order makes no such disallowance.
See Order of 1979, supra note 18.
57. Mack, supra note 43, at 28.
58. Id.
59. See Adams, supra note 39, at 8.
60. See Otis, supra note 34, at 19.
61. Summary action is authorized by Rule 133.01: "The Supreme Court, on its
motion or on motion of any party may summarily affirm, may summarily reverse with
appropriate directions, may remand or dismiss an appeal or other request for relief
upon grounds proper for remand or dismissal, or may limit the issues to be considered
on appeal." MINN. R. Civ. APP. P. 133.01.
62. See Adams, supra note 39, at 5-6, 9.
63. Id. at 8. See Order of 1976, supra note 18, B. A related problem is that of
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Critics of the conference note a number of ways in which it might
damage appellate courts' integrity and their image of impartiality.
Perhaps most significant is the possibility of coercion by conference
officials." Also, when a presiding official predicts the outcome of a
complex case, without the benefit of briefs or oral argument, parti-
cipants may begin to believe that this is the court's usual method
of operation. Furthermore, if a case proceeds to hearing and the pre-
diction of the conference official is proven incorrect, the advice given
by that official at future conferences may be disregarded. Of course,
if parties rely upon, rather than disregard, a conference official's in-
correct estimate, the situation may be even more serious.65 Finally,
some critics feel that judges should be totally removed from settle-
ment discussions because such discussions demean the judicial pro-
cess. It has been said that participation by a judge in settlement dis-
cussions causes him to "lay aside his judicial dignity and assume a
role that has been irreverently characterized as black-robed hag-
gler."6
Prehearing conferences may also be undesirable simply because
of the added costs they impose on litigants. While the cost of attend-
ing a conference is low for parties who reside close to the conference
site, the amount of attorney time and travel expenses required for
outstate parties may be considerable. This added expense may dis-
courage outstate parties from filing meritorious appeals or cause
them to settle cases they might otherwise pursue.
the unscrupulous lawyer using the conference to harass the party who prevailed in the
trial court and who will obviously prevail on appeal. The problem is exacerbated if the
prevailing party or his attorney resides some distance away from the conference site.
See notes 67-68 infra and accompanying text. The Minnesota court is aware of this
problem. If a conference official perceives that a party is using the procedure in bad
faith, he typically will advise the victim to make no concessions, and to file a motion
for summary affirmance. See Otis, supra note 34, at 18.
64. See Otis, supra note 34, at 19; note 55 supra and accompanying text.
65. Adams, supra note 39, at 12. The problem, however, is not always severe. A
presiding official has the benefit of the prehearing statement, copies of the trial briefs
and other pertinent documents, a memo prepared by clerk, and his experience on the
bench to guide him. Also, when an issue is complex the conference official typically
qualifies his views by stating that he has not read the transcript and that his opinions
are "at best only an educated guess." Otis, supra note 34, at 19.
66. Jenswold, Pretrial Conferences, 38 Wis. B. BuLL. 35, 41 (1965) (quoting Wil-
liam H. Morrison). In Minnesota, the conference official rarely discusses dollar figures,
but serves more as an advisor forcing counsel to analyze the merits of the appeal. See
Adams, supra note 39, at 3-4.
67. Adams, supra note 39, at 10.
68. Cf. Otis, supra note 34, at 19 (burden on outstate litigants may suggest
conference should not be mandatory in borderline cases). If, as conference proponents
suggest, however, cases are not easily identified as unlikely to settle, see Otis Address,
supra note 8, at 15, the policy of holding conferences for all cases may be justified. Even
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II1. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT PREHEARING
CONFERENCE
STUDY AND QUESTIONNAIRE
It is impossible to resolve the arguments for and against the
prehearing conference by mere reflection. Virtually every theoretical
benefit the conference offers can be squarely challenged or counter-
balanced by potential disadvantages of the new procedure. Only
objective, quantifiable data will permit accurate inferences concern-
ing the system's success or failure. In order to produce such data, an
empirical analysis was designed to assess the effectiveness of the
Minnesota prehearing conference in its first year of operation. The
data-gathering method employed consisted of two elements: a pre-
hearing conference study and a prehearing conference questionnaire.
A. TnE PREHMARING CONFERENCE STUDY
1. Overall Design
The study was designed to compare various aspects of the appel-
late process in Minnesota for two periods, using a "before and after"
method." The "before," or Period I, group consisted of those civil
cases filed between September 20, 1975 and September 19, 1976, the
year immediately preceding the implementation of the prehearing
conference. The "after," or Period HT, group consisted of those civil
cases filed between September 20, 1976 and September 19, 1977, the
first year of the conference's operation. A full sample method was
used: for both periods, every appealed civil case was included in the
study.70 The total sample size was 1,189 cases, 571 in Period I and 618
in Period II.
2. Data Collection and Evaluation Process
Each case was computer-coded, insofar as the records allowed,
if the cost of attending the conference is substantial, that cost will be far outweighed
by the savings realized if a favorable settlement can be reached since counsel will not
have to prepare briefs and transcripts, or argue the case.
69. This method is not as accurate as a controlled study because factors other
than the prehearing conference may have affected the appellate process between Peri-
ods I and II. A controlled study was not possible, however, because the preheating
conference was made mandatory in almost all civil appeals and, thus, no "control
group" sample was available. See generally M. RoSENBuRo, THE PaamrRL CONFEnENCE
AND EFFEcIvE JusTIcE 16-20 (1964); Goldman supra note 17, at 5.
70. Extraordinary writ petitions were computer-coded but were excluded from
the analysis because they were exempt from conference procedures. See Order of 1976,
supra note 18, G.
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for the factors relevant to this study.7' Of course, given the confiden-
tial nature of the discussions at the prehearing conference, informa-
tion concerning those discussions was unobtainable.7 1
The coded information was analyzed using a computer program
known as the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 3
SPSS provided extensive data manipulation capability. For example,
a particular type of case could be deleted from the statistical analysis
to see what effect its deletion might have. Moreover, categories
could be combined and appropriate values assigned when data was
missing from particular cases. This capability allowed the researcher
to perform "best possible" and "worst likely" analyses. The SPSS
subroutine called "crosstabs" facilitated the creation of tables dis-
playing the relationship between several variables.74 Another SPSS
subroutine allowed computation of mean values for categories of
data and allowed comparison of those means for Period I and Period
II. The SPSS subroutine "CTAB" was used to analyze the inter-
relationships among the many variables involved in more complex
comparisons. 5
71. The primary sources of coded information were the register of actions and the
case files. Conference information was obtained from the prehearing secretary's non-
confidential records. Because the coding required fairly sophisticated interpretation of
court records, three recent law school graduates were employed to assist. This research
group allowed effective daily supervision of the data collection process, and ensured
consistent and accurate coding. Coding began at the Minnesota State Capitol on
October 27, 1978; it was completed on December 15, 1978.
During the entire process, cooperation and assistance was received from the dep-
uty administrator, the prehearing secretary, the clerk, the court, and all its staff
members. The Minnesota Law Review wishes to express its gratitude for their kind
efforts. We extend special appreciation to the diligent research staff.
72. See Order of 1976, supra note 18, D.
73. See generally N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT,
STATIMCAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCI.L SCIENCES (1975). While use of the SPSS package
is a relatively simple matter for one familiar with basic computer operation, analysis
of the data the package produces requires a good deal of statistical expertise. The
authors are grateful for the extensive interpretive assistance provided by Dr. John
Rogers of the California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo. Dr. Rogers was
a visiting post-doctoral associate at the University of Minnesota Applied Statistics
Department during the course of this study.
74. Using "crosstabs," one could, for example, create a table listing the number
and percentage of cases settling in Periods I and II, while controlling for the presence
of a large money judgment.
75. CTAB performs calculations for log-linear model analysis of multidimen-
sional cross classified categorical data. See generally, Y. BISHOP, S. FEIBEG & P.
HoLLAND, DiscnnRE MuLTrv LTE ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTCE (1975). CTAB docu-







Working within the confines of the available data, factors that,
hypothetically, had some bearing on the success of prehearing confer-
ences were identified and assigned numerical values. For descriptive
purposes these factors may be grouped into seven broad areas.
a. Disposition of the Case
Each case was coded according to its final disposition, primarily
to determine the difference in the settlement rate between Period I
and Period I. All possible forms of disposition were noted, however,
so that any change in the rate of affirmances, reversals, remands, or
the use of summary action could be detected.
b. Case Processing Time
Cases were coded for the length of time from filing to hearing and
from hearing to decision, and for the total processing time. This was
done to help ascertain whether the conference allowed the court to
process appeals more efficiently.
c. Decisional Processes
The court's use of oral arguments, division hearings, and sum-
mary and per curiam opinions were noted to help determine whether
the conference resulted in fuller consideration of those cases that did
not settle.
d. Nature of the Case
It seemed likely that certain kinds of cases would be more re-
sponsive to prehearing conference procedures than others. Therefore,
each case was coded for the general area of law involved, the court or
agency from which the case originated, the disposition and amount
of recovery below, the issue on appeal," and the relief requested on
appeal.
e. Status of the Parties
Parties to an appeal were identified as individuals, non-profit
organizations, corporations, other businesses, or government agencies
in order to help discern whether there was any systematic relation-
76. Unfortunately, the codes for "issue on appeal" were ill-defined, leading the
authors to conclude that the results were unreliable. Thus, this Note makes no further
mention of this code category.
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ship between the status of the appealing parties and rates of settle-
ment, and whether prehearing conferences had any effect on those
rates. The appellant was also identified either as plaintiff or defen-
dant below, and the presence or absence of multiple parties was
noted.
f. Distance from the Conference Site
To help analyze whether the added cost imposed on outstate
litigants by the conference affected their decisions to settle or pursue
appeals, cases were coded for the distance the parties' attorneys had
to travel to reach the conference site.
g. The Official Presiding
Cases in Period II were coded according to the status of the
individual presiding at the conference. This allowed for a comparison
between the rates of settlement achieved in conferences at which
justices presided and those at which administrative cifficers presided.
It also allowed the individual justices and officers to be compared
against each other to see if their personal traits had any effect on
settlement rates.
B. THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire was developed to determine the attitude of
members of the Minnesota bar toward the prehearing conference in
its original from, and to assess their impression of proposed changes
in conference rules. Questionnaires were sent to a representative sam-
ple of attorneys who, according to court records, had participated in
prehearing conferences. Tabulations of the responses to the questions
were made and representative comments were noted.
IV. THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE STUDY: RESULTS
AND ANALYSIS
A. THE EFFECT OF THE CONFERENCE ON CASE PROCESSING
1. The Increased Settlement Rate
The primary purpose of the prehearing conference is to reduce
the court's caseload by encouraging settlements. If the conferences
increase the number of cases that settle, the court should be able to
give greater consideration to those cases that come before it, and the
overall quality of appellate decisionmaking should improve. This in-
quiry began, therefore, with a determination of whether there had
been any significant change in the rates of settlement between Peri-
ods I and II.
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The inquiry was complicated by two problems. The first was that
at the conclusion of the study there were 52 cases in Period II that
had not reached final disposition; the most recently filed had been
on the docket for 450 days. Since data from Period I indicated that a
settlement ratd of only 2.8% could be expected for cases of this vin-
tage,7 it was simply assumed that none of these remaining cases
would settle. The second problem was separating out the settled cases
from among all those that had reached final disposition. Formally
settled cases were readily identifiable because they contained an
entry in the record stating "dismissed by stipulation of the parties."
There was another indeterminate-sized group of cases, however, that
consisted of those informally settled without the filing of such a stipu-
lation; these cases were among those that had been dismissed without
opposing motions. This problem was met by using two different
methods for calculating the settlement rates in Periods I and II: the
77. The study showed that the longer a case stayed on the docket, the less likely































































































first method assumed that both formally settled cases and those dis-
missed without opposing motions had been settled; the second as-
sumed that only those cases with formalstipulations had been set-
tled. 8
Both methods showed a statistically significant increase in the
rate of settlement following the implementation of prehearing confer-
ences. Under the first method, the settlement rate rose from 27.9%
in Period I to 39.6% in Period II, a difference of 11.7%. Under the
second method, the settlement rate climbed from 17.4% to 30.1%, a
difference of 12.7%. For the remainder of this analysis, the settlement
increase rate of 12.7% will be used since it was based on the more
statistically and logically reliable assumption.
A 12.7% settlement increase rate, however, does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that the prehearing conference has reduced the
court's caseload, or has allowed the court more time to consider non-
settling cases, because the figure is misleading in two respects. First,
the conferences, as conducted in 1976-1977, effectively removed one
member from the court." It is possible that the increased settlement
rate did not offset this loss. Second, if, as its critics contend, the
conferences encourage litigants to file meritless appeals the higher
settlement rate may simply reflect the fact that the conferences dis-
posed mainly of these cases.
78. As a practical matter, both methods of calculation showed about the same
results. This is because the category of cases including non-opposed motions to dismiss
varied a mere 0.9% between Periods I and II.
79. "Statistical significance" refers to a concept that provides a method of mea-
suring the extent to which an observed change is due to random (unexplained) varia-
tion. Thus, if results are statistically significant at the .10 level, then it means that
the observed result could be expected to occur 10 times in 100 simply by random
chance. The typical cut-off figure for statistical significance in social science work, and
the one used in this study, is .05. This means that an observed change is "significant"
only if the probability of its random occurrence is 5% or less. The statistical signifi-
cance test, therefore, is simply a method of determining when the probability of an
observed change having been caused by random variation is so low that a statistician
is justified in inferring that the change was in fact caused by non-random factors such
as, for example, the imposition of a prehearing conference system.
80. See Adams, supra note 39, at 9 ("The costs imposed on the legal system by
the Minnesota procedure involves the time of one judge ... which is devoted to every
case . . ").
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TABLE 1: SETTLEMENT RATES
Difference
between
Period I* Period II** Period II
cases cases and
settled Percent settled Percent Period I
Method If 146 27.9 220 39.6 11.7
Method 2ff 91 17.4 167 30.1 12.7
* No prehearing conferences held: Sept. 20, 1975 to Sept. 19, 1976.
** First year of conferences: Sept. 20, 1976 to Sept. 19, 1977.
f Formal stipulations and unopposed motions to dismiss both assumed to
indicate settlement.
ft Formal stipulations only assumed to indicate settlement.
To help remove these ambiguities, three additional factors were
analyzed: the form of argument, the form of hearing, and the form of
opinion. It was hypothesized that an increased use of oral arguments,
en banc hearings, or fuller opinion types would indicate that the
prehearing conference had given the court more time to consider
those cases that had not settled. " The data showed that, in Period
II, oral arguments were used in an additional 3.2% of the cases."2 The
rate for en banc hearings, however, was 6% lower in Period II. As in-
dicated in Table H, there was a slight increase in the use of fuller
opinion types; this result, however, was not statistically significant. 3
TABLE 2: OPINIoN TYPES
Period I Period II
Majority with at least
one dissenting or
concurring opinion Number 20 16
Percent 6.0 7.5
Majority with no
dissenting opinion Number 191 127
Percent 57.5 59.3
Per curiam Number 100 62
Percent 30.1 29.0
Summary Number 21 9
Percent 6.3 4.2
(5. Justice Otis has stated that the prehearing conference procedure was adopted
so "that some day we may again hear all cases en banc as we did when I first came to
the court, [and] we can scrutinize one another's opinions with constructive criticism
or dissent." Otis Address, supra note 8, at 4.
82. The number of cases argued orally, either before the court en banc or before
a division of the court, increased from 68.8% in Period I to 72.0% in Period II.
83. The level at which these results become significant is .5. This means that
there is a 50% likelihood that the observed increase in fuller opinion types is attributa-
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2. Case Processing Time
A second purpose of prehearing conferences is to reduce the delay
that litigants face between the time they file their appeal and the
time it is finally disposed of by the court. 4 To determine whether the
conferences were effective in reducing that delay, the average case
processing time for Periods I and II were compared.
The 52 cases that had not reached final disposition prior to the
conclusion of the study" once again presented a problem because the
times between their filings to final disposition could not be calcu-
lated. Therefore, a "best possible/worst likely" method of analysis
was employed to calculate an upper and lower limit for average case
processing time in Period II. The "best possible" approach assumed
that all pending cases reached final disposition on December 11, 1978,
the final day of the study. The "worst likely" approach assumed that
each pending case would take as long to reach final disposition as the
case taking longest to do so in Period I: 740 days.
The "best possible" approach showed the average case process-
ing time decreasing from 308 days in Period I to 256 days in Period
II; the "worst likely" approach showed a decrease of 36 days. These
figures, however, may have been misleading because the sample used
included all matters filed. It is possible that the observed reduction
in average case processing time merely reflected an increased number
of frivolous appeals, encouraged by the conference procedures, which
were quickly disposed of by dismissal, settlement, or summary ac-
tion. To test this possibility, cases dismissed, settled, or disposed of
by summary action were removed from the analysis and the average
case processing time was determined only for the group of cases in
Periods I and II for which majority or per curiam opinions were writ-
ten. A "best possible/worst likely" method was again employed to
deal with the problem presented by pending cases. Both methods
indicated a decrease in average case processing time from 405 days
in Period I to 382 days in Period U1.8"
ble to factors other than the prehearing conference. See note 79 supra. Statistical
significance, however, is merely a tool used by statiticians to help them assess the
strength of their statistical inferences; it certainly is not a conclusive measure. The
data generated on fuller opinion types by this-study, though not statistically significant
at the .05 level within an acceptable level of error, was consistent in showing trends in
the same direction. This fact lends some credence to the proposition that the observed
increased use of fuller opinion types was due to the implementation of prehearing
conferences.
84. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
86. Although it is a pure coincidence that both methods of calculation produced
identical results, it is not surprising that both methods would produce similar results.
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B. THE DYNAMICS OF CASE SETrLEMENT
1. Amenability to Settlement
At the outset of this study, it seemed likely that the prehearing
conference might be more effective in encouraging settlement in cer-
tain types of cases than in others. If these types of cases could be
identified, the Minnesota Supreme Court might limit the mandatory
prehearing conference to these cases, and eliminate or make optional
the conference where settlement prospects had proven low. Therefore,
the study isolated certain factors that seemed likely to make a case
more or less responsive to a prehearing conference.
a. Court or Agency Below
The settlement rate for cases appealed from verdicts or judg-
ments in the district courts showed a positive difference between
Period I and II of approximately 12.7%. This figure is virtually the
same as the average rate observed for the study's entire sample."
Appeals taken from decisions by the Workman's Compensation
Board, however, showed a 16.5% positive difference.
b. Disposition of the Case Below
It was hypothesized that the tendency of the conference to in-
crease settlement rates in cases appealed from trial courts might vary
according to whether a case had been disposed of without trial or had
been appealed from a full trial before a judge or jury. Thus, if litigants
perceived judgments entered into after trial as being less susceptible
to reversal than dismissals of complaints and summary judgments,
the prevailing parties in appeals from judgments entered after a trial
might be less willing to settle. The data was to some degree consistent
with this hypothesis. The settlement rate for appeals taken from
judgments entered after trial increased from 18.7% in Period I to
27.4% in Period II. The settlement rate for appeals from summary
judgments and other dispositions without trial increased from 9.6%
to 24.6%. Although this result indicates the propensity of the confer-
ence to increase the settlement rate of appeals from dispositions with-
out trial, it does not suggest that conferences should be used only for
such cases."
The long processing time for cases in which an opinion is written tends to minimize
the effect of the 740 day "worst case" assumption.
87. The difference between the settlement rate of cases appealed from the dis-
trict courts and the overall settlement rate for all appeals was not statistically signifi-
cant.
88. Even though the increase in settlements witnessed in cases appealed from
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It also seemed probable that interlocutory appeals would be less
likely to settle than appeals from final judgments because the oppor-
tunity to litigate the longer issues at trial depends on the success of
the interlocutory appeal. No such tendency, however, was discovered.
c. The Plaintiff's Request for Relief
When the information was available,8' the plaintiff's request for
relief was categorized either as monetary, declarative, or injunctive.
It seemed likely that conference participants in cases in which mone-
tary relief was sought would respond more favorably to the pressure
for settlement because the conduct of the litigants is more likely to
be a function of purely economic factors. Also, cases involving money
judgments allow the parties greater flexibility in bargaining than do
requests for declaratory or injunctive relief.
The study at least partially confirmed this expectation. In cases
in which the relief sought was primarily monetary, the settlement
rate increased from 12.6% in Period I to 27.3% in Period I, a differ-
ence of 14.7%. Even in cases in which declaratory relief was re-
quested, however, there was an 8.1% positive difference observed
between settlement rates in Period I and Period I. Unfortunately,
the cases in which injunctive relief was requested constituted too
small a portion of the sample to permit a statistically reliable conclu-
sion.
d. Amount of Money Judgment
If the transaction costs of appealing from a money judgment
begin to increase in disproportion to the expected gain that may
result from the appeal, the decision to settle becomes an economically
mandated alternative." Thus, because there are certain fixed trans-
action costs that attend any appeal, it seemed plausible that cases
involving smaller claims would be more likely to settle. 1
dispositions without trial, from 9.6% to 24.6%, far exceeds the increase of from 18.7%
to 27.4% observed in appeals from judgments entered after trial, it should be noted
that the Period II settlement rates for both categories, 24.6% and 27.4% respectively,
are very similar. Since the prehearing conference seems to have driven both categories
to a common settlement level, it could be argued that neither category should be
favored over the other in the future allocation of prehearing conference time.
89. If the type of relief requested was not readily discernible from the records
being used, the researchers were instructed to enter no information. The sample for
this particular analysis, therefore, is somewhat smaller than the overall sample size; a
total of 946 cases were considered as opposed to 1073 cases in the overall sample.
90. Judge Kaufman noted a similar trend in his report on prehearing conferences
in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 1100.
91. See Mack, supra note 43, at 17-26.
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The study confirmed this theory. For those cases in which the
amount of monetary damages obtained at trial was less than $10,000,
the settlement rate rose significantly from 15.0% in Period I to 45.2%
in Period II, a positive difference of 30.2%. For cases in which the
amount of damages exceeded $10,000, the settlement rate showed
some variation, but no meaningful trend was discernible.
e. Number of Parties to the Appeal
It seemed likely that as the number of parties involved in an
appeal increased, the probability of arriving at a settlement with
terms satisfactory to all would decrease in some corresponding fash-
ion. Because of practical limitations, the sample was divided into
only two groups: those in which there were two parties to the appeal
and those in which there were more than two parties. It was thought
that the presence of more than two parties might serve to identify
complex cases that would be less likely to settle. The statistical evi-
dence supported this proposition. In Period I, the settlement rate for
cases involving two parties was 18.9%, but it was only 16.5% for cases
involving more than two parties. In Period II, the settlement rates
rose to 29.5% in two-party actions, and 30.5% in actions where more
than two parties were involved. These figures represent positive dif-
ferences of 10.6% and 14.0%, respectively.
Although it is interesting that the conference seems to have had
a greater impact on actions involving more than two parties, the
results do not point to any significant overall difference. The observed
differentials of 10.6% and 14.0% do not vary widely enough from the
average settlement rate of 12.7% to have any practical implications
for the alteration of future conference procedures.
L Status of the Parties
The two main parties to each appeal were categorized as either
private individuals, non-profit organizations, business corporations,
other businesses, or governmental units. It seemed that the ability of
these groups to obtain funds for appellate litigation might vary signif-
icantly, and that prehearing conferences might accentuate such dif-
ferences. In other words, the more funds a party has available for
litigation, the less willing it may be to settle, since the expense of
participating in a hearing is not so important a consideration." On
the other hand, the conference may actually serve to mute rather
than accentuate this effect. The conference may serve to diminish the
92. This general assumption is analogous to one made in a Yale study of state
supreme court reversal rates. See Note, supra note 10.
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economic inequality of parties by relieving them of the expense of
preparing briefs and oral arguments. The power of wealthier parties
to inflict economic intimidation by refusing to settle would be greatly
diminished in cases in which the presiding official advises the oppo-
nent that a strong case exists in the opponent's favor.
The data did not, however, reveal any such trends. The settle-
ment rates for each available combination of parties increased at
approximately the same rate as the average overall rate of 12.7%. To
the extent that there were differences, no inferences were drawn be-
cause of the small sample sizes in many of the categories.13
g. Distance from Conference Site
It seemed likely that outstate parties whose attorneys had to
travel long distances would be more likely to settle than would parties
living relatively close to the conference site. If such an increase were
observed, it would suggest that the conference had unfairly allocated
its burden and, therefore, unfairly dissuaded outstate parties from
pursuing their appeals. To test this hypothesis, the distance that each
attorney had to travel was analyzed. Surprisingly, the data indicated
no significant relationship between the distance parties must travel
and their rate of settlement.
h. Area of Law
There seemed to be ample reason to believe that cases involving
certain areas of law would be more amenable to conference proce-
dures than others. For instance, a case involving the amount of an
admitted tax liability would certainly be more suited to compromise
than one involving the constitutionality of a state statute. To help
study this question, the cases in the sample were grouped into 45
areas of law; the cases were also grouped under 18 broader headings. 4
As with the distance analysis, this breakdown produced virtually
no meaningful data; in all the studied areas of law, with one excep-
tion, the difference in settlement rates between Periods I and II was
close to the overall average settlement rate increase of 12.7%.15 The
93. A hierarchical, log-linear model constructed with SPSS' "CTAB" program
confirmed that the introduction of pretrial conferences did not influence the interac-
tion between the status of the litigating parties and the ultimate disposition of the
case.
94. The headings used were (1) Contracts, (2) Real Property, (3) Torts-Personal
Injury, (4) Torts-Personal Property, (5) Civil Rights, (6) Labor, (7) Taxes, (8) Public
Interest, (9) Statutes, (10) Unfair Competition, (11) Family Law, (12) Workman's
Compensation, (13) Trusts & Estates, (14) Zoning, (15) Attorney Regulation, (16)
Medical Malpractice, (17) Licensing, and (18) Other.
95. Because of the small sample sizes for these categories, all observed variation
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one exception occurred in the area of family law," where the settle-
ment rate actually dropped from 30.6% in Period I to 25.5% in Period
HY.7 There is no readily apparent explanation for this phenomenon."
2. Relationship Between Settlement and the Presiding Officer
a. Presiding Justices
Since the presiding justice plays a leading role in settlement
discussions and assessments of the probable outcome of cases, it was
thought that the personality and technique of the presiding justice
might influence settlement rates. The settlement rates of each justice
who participated in conferences was, therefore, analyzed. Although
the sample sizes for conferences held by justices other than Justice
Otis are small, and thus of questionable reliability, one trend did
emerge. In Period II, Justice Todd settled 5.6% more of his cases than
Justice Otis."
Justice Otis explained that while "some judges by the nature of
their personalities press harder than others for bringing about a set-
tlement" his approach "falls on the side of gentle persuasion which
may not be quite so effective."'" Justice Todd, on the other hand, is
considered by some to be more forceful in his attempts to encourage
a settlement. Thus, there is at least some evidence to support the
proposition that the personality and technique of the presiding jus-
tice is an important aspect of the conference's ability to produce
settlements.
was rendered statistically insignificant. In the tax case category, for example, the data
showed a positive difference in settlement rates of 23.3% between Periods I and H.
But because the tax case sample was composed of only 59 cases, it became significant
only at the .084 level; this level was far beyond the .05 level that had been chosen as
the minimum level of statistical significance for judging data generated by this study.
See note 79 supra.
96. The category of Family Law was composed of three subcategories: (1) Di-
vorce/Dissolution, (2) Child Custody, and (3) Other Family Law.
97. This drop in settlement rates was statistically significant at the .05 level. See
note 79 supra.
98. In a study of this size and complexity, it would be unusual if some statistical
anomaly did not occur.
99. Justice Todd obtained settlement at 36.4% of his conferences, while Justice
Otis' rate was 30.8%. Any conclusion drawn from these figures, however, must be
tempered by the fact that Justice Otis presided over 225 conferences while Justice
Todd presided over only 33. The low number of cases in Justice Todd's sample means
that the settlement figure obtained, 36.4%, is a far less reliable indicator of his ability
to influence settlement than Justice Otis' 30.8% figure.
100. Otis Address, supra note 8, at 18.
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b. Judicial or Non-judicial Presiding Officer
The settlement rates occuring under Justice Otis and Commis-
sioner Richard Leonard, a non-judicial officer, were compared to see
if any significant difference existed."0' The rate of settlement under
Mr. Leonard was 23.6%12 while under Justice Otis it was 30.8%. Of
course, this 7.2% difference may be a function of their different per-
sonalities and techniques. But, given that Justice Otis considers him-
self to be a gentle persuader and not an aggressive mediator, the
difference also supports the conclusion that Supreme Court justices,
because of their prestige and presumed knowledge of the court's
workings, are better equipped to encourage settlements than are non-
judicial officers of the court.
This information does not fully answer the question of who
should preside at prehearing conferences. Since justices are effec-
tively removed from the court when preparing for and conducting
prehearing conferences, the issue is whether the marginally higher
settlement rate they produce justifies the time investment required
to produce it. It is equally possible that a more efficient solution
would be to leave the justice on the bench where his productivity may
more than offset the disadvantages of having the conference adminis-
tered by a non-judicial officer.
V. THE PREHEARING CONFERENCE QUESTIONNAIRE:
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The questionnaire was designed to discover the attitudes of
members of the Minnesota bar toward the prehearing conference dur-
ing its first year of operation, and to elicit their impressions of pro-
posed changes in the conference rules. 03 Questionnaires were sent to
238 attorneys who had participated in conferences during the year,
and 163 replies were received. Because many of the attorneys re-
sponding to the questionnaire had attended more than one confer-
ence, the 163 replies actually covered 510 conferences.' To encourage
101. The comparison of Mr. Leonard's settlement rate with that of Justice Otis
was the most meaningful since both had presided over a substantially larger number
of conferences than had the other members of the court. Since cases were assigned
to conference officials virtually at random, there appears to be little chance that the
observed settlement rates were biased by unknown factors.
102. Mr. Leonard's sample included several pending cases. For the purposes of
this comparison, it was assumed that none would settle. If, on the other hand, it had
been assumed that all would settle, Mr. Leonard's settlement rate would have in-
creased only from 23.6% to 26.6%.
103. The proposed changes in conference rules have now, for the most part, been
enacted. See Order of 1979, supra note 18.
104. The average responding attorney had attended 3.12 conferences.
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candid responses, the attorneys polled were assured that respondents'
names would remain confidential.
A. ATTITUDE OF THE BAR TowARD PREHEARING CONFERENCES DURING
THE FIRST YEAR OF OPERATION
1. Settlement
a. Question: How many of the cases [in which you participated
in prehearing conferences] settled prior to formal hearings?
Number of cases
120
Percent of total cases
23.53
b. Question: Of those cases which settled, in how many do
you feel that the prehearing conference was a significant factor?
Number of cases
Percent of total settling
cases
85.83
c. Question: Do you feel the prehearing conference has signifi-
cantly increased settlement negotiations in those cases appealed to









2. Narrowing and Clarifying Issues
a. Question: In cases that did not settle, do you feel the confer-
ence was effective in narrowing and clarifying issues, thus producing
better briefs and arguments? If so, in how many cases?
Number responding Percent
Yes - 55 39.57
No - 84 60.43
Cases in which issues





The response to this question indicates that the legal community
does not regard the conference as especially effective in narrowing or
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clarifying issues. Judging from the low number of cases listed, it is
apparent that many lawyers who found the conference effective for
some cases did not find it effective for all. Some of the comments
accompanying the responses help explain the small number of posi-
tive answers. One practitioner suggested, for example, that he did not
feel any conference officer could dissuade an attorney from briefing
an issue that the attorney was "bent on presenting to the court."'' 5
Another indicated that while the conference did not result in any
issues being excluded from briefs in any of the appeals in which he
had participated, oral argument often did focus on the issues recom-
mended by the presiding official. A few of the responding attorneys
indicated that because the presiding official was unprepared, no clar-
ification or narrowing of issues was possible at the conference. The
overall reaction of the responding attorneys, however, does seem to
indicate that conference proponents may be guilty of overstatement
when they claim that the conference helps narrow issues and
"streamline unsettled cases for adjudication."'0 8
b. Question: Were issues ever excluded from argument without
your agreement? If so, in how many cases?
Number of cases Percent of total
Number in which issues cases in
responding Percent excluded survey
Yes-3 1.9 3 0.58
No - 155 98.1
This response indicates that it is extremely rare for the confer-
ence to narrow issues without the consent of counsel for all parties.
,Nonetheless, it is surprising that any attorney responded that issues
were narrowed without his or her agreement; actions taken at the
conference are to be by stipulation of the parties only. One member
of the court indicated, however, that he considers narrowing of issues
an exception to the normal rule.' 7 The responses confirm that the
exception is rarely used.
3. Prediction of Outcome on Appeal
a. Question: Has the officer presiding at one of your conferences
ever predicted the outcome of your case at the prehearing conference?
If so, in how many cases?
105. This response and all other questionnaire responses are on file at the offices
of the Minnesota Law Review.
106. See Kaufman, supra note 17, at 1094.
107. See Otis, supra note 34, at 18.
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Number responding Percent
Yes - 115 71.87
No - 45 28.13






b. Question: In instances where the conference officer predicted
the outcome of your case at the prehearing conference and the case
subsequently went to hearing, how often was the prediction
[incorrect]?
Number of incorrect Percent of total cases in which
predictions predictions were made
26 14.94
The response to question "a" indicates that it is common for
hearing officers to predict the outcome of cases. The comments on
this question reveal that the presiding officer may have alluded to the
final outcome of the case, even if not making a formal prediction,
more often than the 71.87% figure indicates. Many of the responding
attorneys stated that the officer had not predicted the outcome of
their case simply because "predict" was too strong a word; rather, the
officer's views had often taken the form of a "ballpark estimate" or
"weatherman's forecast."
The response to question "b" suggests that there is some justifi-
cation for the conference critics' concern over the loss of respect for
judicial decisionmaking brought about by incorrect predictions.'
While it is possible that the 14.94% figure is high due to various
factors in the survey methodology, the comments clearly indicate
that predictions were incorrect in at least some cases. Even though
the number of incorrect predictions is not high, the possible detri-
mental effect they may have on the attitude of the legal community
toward prehearing conferences requires that presiding officers con-
tinue to inform counsel that any predictions are made on the basis
of an incomplete record, and it is possible that the full court will not
behave in the predicted manner.
108. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
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4. Helpfulness in Evaluating Merits of Appeal
Question: Did the views expressed by the presiding justice or
officer enable you to better evaluate the merits of your appeal?
Number responding Percent
Yes - 88 56.05
No - 69 43.95
The positive response to this question was unexpectedly high. It
suggests that the conference official was often able to help attorneys
understand the probable attitude of the court toward their appeal.
The comments to this question indicate that some attorneys rely to
a great extent on the presiding official's assessment of the merits if
that official is a justice; many indicated they would strongly consider
dropping a case if the justice's comments were unfavorable. Another
group indicated that the views of the conference officers were helpful
mainly in allowing their clients independently to evaluate the merits
of the appeal. One attorney commented, for example, that in one of
his cases the views of the conference officer allowed him to give his
client convincing reasons for dismissing a "longshot" appeal while
ensuring the client that all reasonable remedies had been pursued.
Some of the comments indicated that the presiding official's views
gave attorneys additional support for their own positions. Others
indicated that the official's views were helpful to their opponent's
position, but not to their own." 9
5. Pressure Applied by the Conference Officer
Question: Do you feel the presiding conference justice or officer
,applied undue pressure to force settlement? If so, in how many cases?
Number of cases Percent of total
Number in which pressure cases in
responding Percent applied survey
Yes - 21 13.04 29 5.68
No - 140 86.96
The low positive response rate to this question indicates that, in
a system in which the conference official is not empowered to force
agreement, the concern over the possible use of coercive tactics by
conference officials is largely unfounded. Some of the comments on
109. "I fully understood the merits of my case-however my opponent didn't and
I'm sure the [conference] officer was of assistance to him." Questionnaire no. 6 (on
file at the Minnesota Law Review).
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this question reflected the view that the undue pressure that did exist
was inherent in the conference setting and not something brought
about directly by the presiding official. Some commenting attorneys
cited the extra expenses caused by the conference, and the fact that
conference officials were free to comment on the merits of the cases,
as examples of the types of indirect pressures, inherent in the confer-
ence setting, that "force" litigants toward settlement. Two others felt
that the presiding official had acted coercively by requiring them to
appear at a second conference' 0 even though this procedure is explic-
itly provided for in the conference rules.
6. The Presiding Official
a. Question: Do you feel, in general, that the prestige of a Min-
nesota Supreme Court Justice significantly adds to the efficiency of
the prehearing conference?
Number responding Percent
Yes - 124 77.02
No - 37 22.98
b. Question: Do you feel, in most cases, a knowledgeable officer
appointed by the court would be just as effective as a Minnesota
Supreme Court Justice?
Number responding Percent
Yes - 43 27.04
No - 116 72.96
By their answers to these questions, the majority of responding
attorneys revealed their belief that judicial officers are more effective
conference officials. The choice of whether judicial or non-judicial
officers should be used in future conferences, therefore, must reflect
a consideration of this subjective factor in addition to the compara-
tive settlement rates observed for the two types of officials, and the
comparative costs involved.
7. General Attitude Toward the Prehearing Conference
a. Question: Do you feel the prehearing conference is, overall,
a fair and just proceeding?
110. The "Justice in charge set another prehearing conference and demanded
that I produce my client when I would not yield to his settlement attempts at the first
conference." Questionnaire no. 54 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
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Number responding Percent
Yes - 138 87.90
No - 19 12.10
b. Question: Do you feel the conference should be continued,
but made optional, or discontinued?
Number responding Percent
Continue - 100 63.45
Optional - 32 20.12
Discontinue - 27 16.43
Thus, despite their occasional negative sentiments,' members
of the Minnesota bar seem overwhelmingly to agree that the confer-
ences are fair and should be continued. The comments of those attor-
neys who thought the conferences were unfair and should be made
optional or discontinued emphasized the costs that prehearing con-
ferences add to the appellate process, especially for outstate liti-
gants." 2
B. THE BAR'S IMPRESSION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN CONFERENCE
RuLEs
The questionnaire included five of the most noteworthy propos-
als for changing the then-existing conference procedures. These
proposals have now been embodied, in substantial part, in the new
conference rules."' Participating attorneys were asked to indicate
their approval, disapproval, or lack of opinion.
111. "It's all a waste of time." Questionnaire no. 244 (on file at the Minnesota
Law Review).
112. Some comments by survey respondents follow:
The expense of travel to St. Paul, using a full day of time, in our opinion
is unwarranted. As an alternative, the Justice could examine the file and
write a letter warning them of the probable pitfalls and suggesting they
explore settlement. Such a letter could be shown to each client and perhaps
with better results than a recital to the client of the verbal warning received
at the [conference].
Questionnaire no. 136 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
Consideration should be given to whether the presence of low-income
clients should be excused when the travel expense is burdensome-my client
was not required to attend, and simply could not have afforded to attend,
with a 600+ mile trip.
Questionnaire no. 64 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
113. See note 18 supra.
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1. The Presiding Official
Statement: The proposed rule provides only for justices holding
prehearing conferences; officers of the court would no longer be au-
thorized to do so.
Number responding Percent
Approve - 118 73.75
Disapprove - 22 13.75
No opinion - 20 12.50
The great number of positive responses to this proposal is in
accord with what has already been observed: Justices conduct confer-
ences more effectively than appointed officers. It also indicates that
the legal community's continued approval of the conference may de-
pend on justices, rather than non-judicial officers presiding.
2. Relationship Between the Presiding Justice and Other Members
of the Court
Under the original conference rules, a justice was not allowed to
communicate with other court members in regard to cases he had
presided over in prehearing conferences. The proposed rule would
allow justices who had presided at conferences to become integrally
involved in the ultimate disposition of those cases.
a. Statement: Under the proposed rule the prehearing confer-
ence statement and conference discussion would no longer be treated
as confidential."'
Number responding Percent
Approve - 38 23.60
Disapprove -99 61.49
No opinion - 24 14.91
b. Statement: Under the proposed rule the justice presiding
over the conference for a case will no longer be disqualified from
sitting on that case, although he will not write the opinion. ',5
114. Under the new rule as enacted, settlement discussions are still treated as
confidential, but the prehearing conference statement and other discussions are not.
See Order of 1979, supra note 18, D. One of the justifications for this change is that
it permits the clerk of court to process prehearing statements. Before the change in
rules, statements had to be filed with the presiding justice's secretary.
115. The new rule, as enacted, not only permits the justice presiding at the
conference to sit with the court, but also fails to prohibit him from writing the court's
opinion. See MINN. R. Civ. Aip. P. 133.02.
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Number responding Percent
Approve - 62 38.99
Disapprove - 89 55.97
No opinion - 8 5.03
c. Statement: The proposed rule states that the presiding jus-
tice may recommend in his Prehearing Conference Order that the
court summarily affirm or reverse the lower court. This is opposed to
the old rule under which there was no communication between the
conference officer and the court.
Number responding Percent
Approve - 59 36.20
Disapprove - 99 60.74
No opinion - 5 3.06
d. Statement: The justice may, under the proposed rule, decide
whether the case should be heard en banc, by a division of the court,
or without oral argument.
Number responding Percent
Approve - 112 68.71
Disapprove - 39 23.93
No opinion - 12 7.36
Typical comments on proposals "a", "b", and "c" reflect the
concern that these changes might give one justice too much power,",
and also might tend to inhibit frank discussion at prehearing confer-
ences." The high negative response rate to these three proposals
indicates that the cumulative effect of their enactment may be to
116. "Such a rule places too much power in a single Justice. In two of my cases
the hearing justice predicted a result that I would lose when in each case I won a
unanimous decision on appeal." Questionnaire no. 130 (on file at the Minnesota Law
Review)
117. The proposal that the prehearing conference statement and conference dis-
cussion no longer be treated as confidential was heavily criticized. For example, one
responding practitioner said: "Confidentiality must be preserved to foster meaningful
settlement negotiations. If there is a chance that the justices who will hear the case
know what went on, lawyers will not be as frank and open at the conference." Ques-
tionnaire no. 245 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review). Another remarked "that this
rule would significantly damage the frankness of the matter discussed and the way in
which they are discussed and would make the possibility of settlement lessened."
Questionnaire no. 114 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review). Finally, one attorney
contended that "on final hearing you would be arguing the views of both the trial court
and the hearing justice." Questionnaire no. 135 (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
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undermine the legal community's favorable impression of the pre-
hearing conference concept by removing perceived safeguards against
coercion.
It is obvious that if a justice presiding at a prehearing conference
may brief his fellow justices on all the discussion that took place at a
conference (except for settlement discussions), and if he may also
participate fully in the ultimate disposition of the case, the confer-
ence participants are unlikely to candidly discuss their case before
him. Although the added leverage these proposals give presiding jus-
tices may enable them to actually force frank discussion, this new
leverage is achieved at the expense of increased opportunities and
incentives for coercive practices. Even if the members of the court do
not regularly make use of this power to coerce, the proposals seem
unjustified; the state's highest court should be a collegial decision-
making body that reaches its decisions through full-fledged adversary
proceedings. Procedures that allow a single justice to circumvent this
process, and which assign the practical determination of an -appel-
lant's fate to an informal hearing, place the goal of judicial economy
on too high a pedestal. The bar's disapproval of proposals "a", "b",
and "c" is ample evidence that the changes are undesirable for rea-
sons far more important than unclogging the court's calender.
The favorable response of the legal community to statement "d",
however, indicates that it may be a worthwhile reform. The proposal
simply gives the presiding justice at a prehearing conference the
power to decide whether the case should be heard en banc, by a
division of the court, or without oral argument. This determination
was previously made by the screening commissioner.
Although some of the comments on this proposal reflect the fear
that it also might have the effect of increasing the presiding justice's
coercive powers, on balance the change appears justifiable. A presid-
ing official might attempt to use this power to force parties to settle,
but regardless of what action the official takes, the parties will not
be deprived of a collegial decision of the court based on fully briefed
arguments. Therefore, this reform achieves the goal of increasing the
presiding justice's power to encourage settlement without destroying
litigants' rights to a collegial decision.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is no question that the Minnesota Supreme Court's pre-
hearing conference experiment has been a success. The fact that,
during the experimental year, the overall rate of settlement was
12.7% higher than during the preceding year lends some support to
the hypothesis that prehearing conferences reduce appellate court
workloads. It is also significant that the average time required to
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process a case during the experimental year was 382 days, down sub-
stantially from the 405 days required in the previous year.
The findings of this study cast serious doubt upon the criticisms
that prehearing conferences force litigants into unfavorable settle-
ments, impose unfair expenses on certain parties, and cause a loss of
respect for the appellate process. Moreover, the study has produced
evidence that judicial officers are more effective than non-judicial
officers in encouraging settlement. Unfortunately, this threshold
finding does not resolve the more subtle issue of whether it may be
counterproductive to remove a justice from the bench in order to have
him perform duties that non-judicial officers perform almost as well.
Finally, the study process revealed a pressing need: the court should
create some monitoring system for the conferences.
The most interesting information generated by this study, how-
ever, may be the comments that practicing attorneys added to their
questionnaires. These comments, as well as the questionnaire results,
indicate that some of the recent changes in conference rules may be
ill advised. There is little doubt that the new rules, which allow jus-
tices to participate actively in both the preliearing conference and
final dispositon of a case, will diminish the confidential nature of the
conference. The irony of this situation is that most of the question-
naire comments revealed that confidentiality was the essential ele-
ment behind the success of the conference. It is hoped that the prac-
ticing bar's reaction to these rule changes will not be so unfavorable
as to undo the positive results observed in this study.
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